To Structure Political Conflict: the Institutionalisation of Referendums on European Integration in the Nordic Countries by Sitter, Nick
  
  
The Centre for  
European 
and Asian Studies 
 
 
 
REPORT 
 
1/2007 
ISSN 1500-2683 
 
 
To Structure Political Conflict: the 
Institutionalisation of Referendums on 
European Integration in the Nordic Countries 
 
Nick Sitter, Department of Public Governance, the 
Norwegian School of Management BI 
 
 
A publication from: 
Centre for European and Asian Studies at 
Norwegian School of Management BI  
0442, Oslo 
Norway 
 
Prepared for European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops 
 Helsinki, May 7-12, 2007 
Nick Sitter, 2007, p.1  
 
Nick Sitter 
Department of Public Governance 
The Norwegian School of Management BI 
 
 
To Structure Political Conflict: the Institutionalisation of 
Referendums on European Integration in the Nordic Countries 
 
“The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power.” 
E. E. Schattschneider, 19601 
 
“Nec audiendi qui solent dicere, Vox populi, vox Dei, quum tumultuositas vulgi 
semper insaniae proxima sit”  
[Listen not to those who say ‘the voice of the people is the voice of God’, because the 
turbulent crowd is always near insanity]  (Alcuin of York to Charlemagne, 798) 
 
 
Schattschneider’s observation about the importance of power to structure political 
conflicts, or to determine the appropriate arena, is particularly pertinent to the politics 
of referendums on European integration. Yet when this power is used to call 
referendums in representative democracies, it often has unpredictable consequences. 
In France and the Netherlands the decisions to try to ratify the Constitutional Treaty 
by referendum reflected the governments’ confidence that the substantial pro-EU 
majorities reported in opinion polls would translate into east victories for the ‘yes’-
camp. Both governments may have found it tempting to re-assess the validity of 
Alcuin’s millennium-old advice of during the summer of 2005. In the Nordic 
countries, pro-integrationists and Eurosceptics have faced each other in referendums 
in the Nordic countries on eleven occasions. These referendums too have been a 
double-edged sword: the governments of the day have lost five of these eleven 
referendums. However, they generally win parliamentary votes: on nine other 
occasions closer participation in European integration has been ratified successfully 
by parliaments without direct popular consultation. If defeat at the hand of a popular 
majority in a referendum might encourage governing parties to re-assess their 
commitment to direct democracy, several Nordic parties have had reason to consider 
the balance between direct and indirect democracy in the last four decades.  
 
Yet there has been no shortage of referendums on European integration, in the Nordic 
countries or elsewhere in Europe. Of twenty major decisions on participation in 
European integration, Nordic governments have used the referendum in eleven 
instances. Of the then twenty-five EU member states, ten had decided to try to ratify 
the constitution by referendum before the process was de-railed by the ‘no’-votes in 
the French and Dutch referendums of May 2005. This prevalence of referendums can 
be explained only partly by constitutional requirements: only in Ireland are 
referendums obligatory on European integration; in Denmark they are required for 
matters that involve transfers of sovereignty unless parliament can muster a 5/6 super-
majority. Most referendums on European integration, in the Nordic countries as well 
                                                 
1 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America 
(Chicago: Holt, Rinehart & Einston, 1960). 
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as in the EU, have been voluntarily and knowingly called by the government of the 
day. The present chapter explores the politics and practice of referendums on 
European integration in the four Nordic states and the patterns and dynamics of party 
competition (and public opinion) that have shaped these differences. It suggests that, 
over time, the use of referendums ‘locks in’ expectations: procedures for ratification 
become institutionalised, and this institutionalisation has been driven by party tactics. 
Institutionalisation is maintained by consensus among the main parties, and ‘hard’ 
Eurosceptic parties continue to try to contest parliamentary ratification of decisions 
about European integration. In Denmark as broad cross-party consensus has been 
developed on the use of the referendum, and the main political parties even seek to 
build broad consensus on the recommended outcome. In Norway, the two ‘no’ results 
in referendums makes another referendum all but inevitable if the country is to apply 
for full EU membership for a third time. Finland was set to ratify the Constitutional 
Treaty by parliamentary vote, confirming what looks increasingly like a pattern of not 
using referendums on European questions. Only Sweden saw a more turbulent debate: 
most major parties supported the decision to ratify the Constitutional treaty by 
referendum, but the decision was far from uncontroversial. 
 
 
Referendums on European Integration in the Nordic States  
 
Why so many referendums on European integration in the Nordic countries? To date, 
in the four Nordic countries, eleven contests over participation in closer European 
integration have been played out in the form of referendums.2 Six have seen the pro-
integration side triumph, while the Eurosceptics have carried the day on five 
occasions. Consequently the four states participate in European integration to 
different extents: Finland is a full member of the European Union and has adopted the 
single currency; Sweden has rejected participation in Economic and Monetary Union; 
and Denmark has not only opted out of EMU but has also reserved its right to limit 
participation in Justice and Home Affairs. Norway, on the other hand, has rejected EU 
membership twice, but nevertheless participates in the EU’s internal market and a 
series of other initiatives. The Nordic governments advocated ‘yes’ votes in all the 
referendums, as, in most cases, did the parliamentary majority. Nearly half the 
referendums went against the governments’ wishes; whereas only once has a 
government lost a major vote on European integration in parliament. At the very least, 
referendums seem to be a high-risk strategy for ratification of EU initiatives. Yet most 
of these referendums were voluntary. Each of the four states has ratified at least one 
treaty by parliamentary approval. If the Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish accessions 
to the European Economic Area (EEA) and Finland’s joining EMU are counted, the 
Nordic parliaments have ratified closer integration nine times without recourse to 
referendums, not counting the planned parliamentary ratification of the Constitutional 
Treaty in Finland and Sweden.  
 
All four Nordic constitutions allow for referendums, the Danish, Finnish and Swedish 
ones explicitly and the Norwegian implicitly. Only the Danish constitution makes 
                                                 
2 For the purpose of the present paper the four Nordic countries include Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden; whereas Iceland is not included here since it has not held referendums on European Union 
membership. For the sake of simplicity the term EU is used also to include the European Economic 
Community before the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in November 1993, except where reference 
is only to the pre-Maastricht EEC. 
Nick Sitter, 2007, p.3  
referendums mandatory under certain circumstances, and provides for binding 
referendums. The relevant articles in terms of participation in European integration 
are A.20 on decisions that involve delegation of sovereignty to international 
organisations (this requires a five-sixths majority of all MPs, or a referendum) and 
A.42 which permits parliament to submit a new law to a referendum. Finland’s 
constitutional reform of 1999 simplified A.22 of 1987, which in turn codified the 
practice from 1931;3 A.53 permits consultative referendums. Sweden’s A.8.4 of the 
1974 constitution permits parliament to call a consultative referendum; A.8.15 
stipulates a binding referendum on constitutional change may be requested by 10% of 
the MPs, and that one must be held if 1/3 of parliament approves. The Norwegian 
constitution does not address referendums. All four countries have used consultative 
referendums on both European and domestic policy, though only extremely 
exceptionally in Finland. These rules and practices are summer up in table 1. In all 
four cases the constitutional stipulations and actual practices pre-date the present 
project of European integration. 
 
Table 1 – Nordic Referendums (government defeats in bold text) 
 Constitution Legislation and 
guidelines 
The use of referendums 
Norway No constitutional 
provision  
Consultative ref as and 
when parliament 
legislates for it 
1905, independence 
1905, the new king 
1919, prohibition 
1926 repeal prohibition 
1972, EEC membership 
1994, EU membership 
 
Sweden A.8.4 on consultative 
referendums  
A.8.15 on binding 
constitutional ref 
1922 law on refs 
 
 
1979 law on refs on 
constitutional change 
(never used) 
1922, prohibition 
1955, driving on the right 
1957, pensions 
1980, nuclear power 
1994, EU membership 
2003, EMU 
 
Finland No constitutional 
provision until 
1987/1999 reforms: 
A.53 on consultative ref 
 
1930s parliament 
adopts guidelines  
 
1931, prohibition 
1994, EU membership 
Denmark 1953 Constitution on 
binding refs: 
A.20 on sovereignty 
A.29 on voting age 
A.42 to confirm an act 
of parliament 
Consultative refs are 
not covered by the 
constitution, and may 
be held as and when 
parliament legislates for 
it 
Pre’53: 1916, 1920, 1939*, 1953 
A.29: 1961, 1969, 1971, 1978 
A.20: 1972 EU; 1992 M-I; 1998 
Amsterdam; 2000 EMU 
A.42: 1963 (‘land laws’)*  
A.42 + A.19: 1993 M-II 
1986 SEA - consultative 
* the 1939 referendum failed because the ‘yes’ majority was too small; 1953 was a double referendum; 
the 1963 referendum featured four related proposals, all of which were rejected. 
 
 
                                                 
3 M. Suksi, ‘The Advisory Referendums in Finland’ in M. Niemivuo & T. Majuri (eds), Outlooks on 
Democratic Institutions in the Baltic Sea Region – Experiences from the Finnish Presidency of the 
Working Group on Assistance to Democratic Institutions (WGDI) in 1998-1999, (Helsinki: Ministry of 
Justice, 1999), p.69-85. 
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In the Nordic countries referendums have been used for the full range of decisions on 
treaty ratifications, from the initial decisions to join the EU (or its predecessor, the 
EEC), to decisions about participation in the single currency and ratification of new 
treaties. All four states called referendums on accession to the EU. In Denmark 
referendums were also held on the Single European Act, Maastricht and Amsterdam 
treaties; whereas the Finns and Swedes ratified the Amsterdam treaty by 
parliamentary vote. None of the three EU member states held referendums on the 
Nice Treaty. Both Denmark and Sweden went down the referendum path for EMU, 
although by choice in Sweden and perforce in Denmark; whereas all the Finnish 
parties agreed that EMU could be adopted without a referendum (including the party 
that opposed EMU membership). The twelfth Nordic referendum on European 
integration was set for September 27th, 2005, in Denmark, but French and Dutch 
voters put an end to that when they rejected the Constitutional Treaty. The two other 
governments had chosen to ratify the treaty by parliamentary vote, a move which was 
considerably more controversial in Sweden than in Finland. All three suspended their 
ratification processes (Finland resumed it and ratified the Treaty in December 2006), 
which in turn prevented a Eurosceptic rebellion in the ruling Swedish Social 
Democratic party. Denmark and Finland appear to have institutionalised their means 
for decision making: Denmark in favour of using referendums on major steps in 
European integration; Finland against it. In Sweden, on the other hand, the main 
parties’ effort to institutionalise a pattern of parliamentary ratification has proven 
more problematic. In Norway any government will have little choice but to call a 
referendum (or even two referendums) if it is to reverse the two ‘no’ decision; but this 
did not prevent parliamentary ratification of the EEA agreement. 
 
Table 2 Major decisions on European integration: yes/no ratio in referendums.  
 Denmark Norway Finland Sweden 
EEC 
membership 
1972: 63.4/36.6 1972: 46.5/53.5  
 
 
 
Single 
European Act 
1986: 56.2/43.8    
Maastricht 
treaty 
1992: 49.3/50.7 
1993: 56.7/43.3 
   
To join EEA 
 
 parliamentary 
decision only 
parliamentary 
decision only 
parliamentary 
decision only 
EU 
membership 
 1994: 47.8/52.2 1994: 56.9/43.1 1994: 52.3/46.8
Amsterdam 
treaty 
1998: 55.1/44.9  parliamentary 
decision only 
parliamentary 
decision only 
Nice treaty 
 
parliamentary 
decision only 
 parliamentary 
decision only 
parliamentary 
decision only 
To join EMU 
 
2000: 46.8/53.2  parliamentary 
decision only 
2003: 42.0/55.9
Constitutional 
Treaty 
(planned) 
Referendum 
(suspended) 
 parliamentary 
decision only 
(suspended) 
parliamentary 
decision only 
Reform 
Treaty (plans) 
unclear at time 
of writing 
 parliamentary 
decision only 
parliamentary 
decision only 
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Representative Democracy, Direct Democracy and European Integration  
 
Few, if any, of the referendums held on European integration over the last half-
century have been motivated primarily by the principle that that the electorate – as the 
ultimate source of national sovereignty in a majoritatiran democracy – should directly 
choose the basis for the relationship between their country and the EU. The motives 
have, at best, been mixed. Most European states, including ardent users of the 
referendums such as Switzerland and Italy, feature political systems that mix the two 
theories of democracy discussed by Robert Dahl in Preface to Democratic Theory4 – 
the ‘republican’ model of representative democracy and the ‘populist’ model of pure 
majority rule. Dahl’s key point is that neither of the two democratic theories provides 
an adequate model for liberal democracy, and that in practice hybrid models are 
required. In West European politics the majoritarian Westminster model comes 
closest to Dahl’s ‘populist logic’, as it is based on the logic of majority (in reality 
often plurality) rule, adversarial politics and the argument that clear choices between 
alternative elites provides for strong accountability. Lijphart’s consensual 
democracies come closer to the ‘republican’ logic: they tend to feature power-sharing, 
balance of power and representative electoral systems.5 The referendum can be found 
in both types of systems, and Lijphart rightly notes that although it might be 
considered a majoritarian instrument the referendum can also serve as an instrument 
that limits the abilities of the majority of the elected representatives to exercise power. 
In other words the referendum may serve both as a ‘sword’ in the hands of a majority 
that seeks to push through or legitimise a particular policy initiative; or as a ‘shield’ 
that adds another veto-player to the political game and thereby makes it more difficult 
to pass legislation. It is this duality of the referendum that helps explain its relatively 
frequent use on European questions despite the well-known risks that attend putting a 
government policy to popular vote.   
 
From the majoritarian perspective, the referendum offers an excellent instrument to 
ensure that a law enjoys majority support, or (depending on the rate of abstentions) at 
least that it is not actively opposed by a majority. In a system that features some 
degree of balance of power, for example in the form of a bi-cameral legislature or 
separate election of the executive and legislative branches of government, the 
referendum offers the government the option of appealing directly to the voters. Even 
in unitary states, a minority government or a government that cannot rely on the 
loyalty of its parliamentary deputies might find this option attractive. In either case, it 
might also offer the legislature an instrument against the executive. In Switzerland 
and Italy, rules that permit popular initiatives from below to force through or reverse 
legislation provide opportunities for direct ‘bottom-up’ majority rule. Perhaps more 
importantly in the present context, the referendum provides an opportunity for 
majoritarian decision-making on subjects that cut across party lines. Maor & Smith 
have argued that to the extent that it can be analysed as a single issue, opposition to 
European integration may be considered a ‘maverick issue’ that cuts across the 
                                                 
4 R. A. Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). 
5 A. Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One 
Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), and Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms 
and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries , (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 
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mainstream left-right dimension of political competition.6 A similar argument has 
prompted several political parties (particularly those divided on the European 
question) to argue that their country’s participation in European integration should be 
decided by referendum because the question cannot be legitimately settled by a party-
political general election.  
 
From the consensual perspective, the referendum provides one more veto-point in the 
political game; one more element in the separation of power. Even if the referendum 
is binding (most referendums on European integration are formally consultative), the 
very use of the referendum may depend on the executive, legislature and/or the courts. 
As a popular initiative the referendum may limit the power of legislative majority 
(which, depending on the electoral system and the distribution of votes, might well 
only represent a plurality). Perhaps most significantly in the present context, the 
referendum is often used as an instrument to slow down or shield against 
constitutional change. Most European states’ constitutions feature rules that make 
constitutional amendment more difficult that the passing of normal law, and in several 
cases this includes provisions for referendums. Of the twenty-seven EU member 
states, one-third feature rules that stipulate that some types of participation in 
European integration require super-majorities in parliament, if not referendums.7 
Inasmuch as participation in European integration might have constitutional 
implications for a state, the use of the referendum to ratify European treaties may be 
considered akin to the use of referendums to ratify constitutional change. In other 
words, to the extent that referendum may be a desirable an instrument to safeguard the 
constitution and provide extra legitimacy for constitutional change, referendums on 
European integration are also likely to be warranted.   
 
Nevertheless, although the referendum may be compatible with both the majoritarian 
and consensus models of representative democracy, the fact remains that it is a risky 
strategy for an elected government. As French President Jacques Chirac learned, even 
opinion polls that indicate a solid majority in favour of the government’s proposals 
does not guarantee a positive result.8 In the light of the results in France and the 
Netherlands in 2005, the rejection of the Treaty of Nice by Irish voters in 2001, and 
the five defeats inflected by Scandinavian voters on their governments on EU 
referendums, it is tempting to ask whether referendums are structurally biased against 
the government. As Lawrence LeDuc’s chapter in this volume explains, there are at 
least four reasons why this might be the case.9 The first reason is that all new policy 
initiatives or proposals face a degree of resistance simply in the form of inertia. A 
tendency toward conservatism, perhaps motivated by risk-aversion, is of course not 
                                                 
6 M. Maor & G. Smith, “On the Structuring of Party Competition: The Impact of Maverick Issues”, in 
T. Bryder (ed.) Party Systems, Party Behaviour and Democracy, (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political 
Studies Press, 1993). 
7 In addition to Ireland and Denmark, this includes: Slovakia, the Czech Republic and France (3/5 
majority requirements); Austria, Finland, Belgium and Poland (2/3 majority); as well as Malta’s mixed 
system (its EU accession referendum had to be confirmed after a general election). S. Hagemann, “The 
EU Reform Treaty: Easier Signed than Ratified?”, EPC Policy Brief, July 2007.  
8 At the time Chirac called the referendum, in July 2004, polls indicated a 60 – 70% ‘yes’ vote. S. 
Marthaler, “The French Referendum on Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty 29 May 2005”, 
EPERN Referendum Briefing no 12 (Sussex University/RIIA, 2005) 
9 See also L. LeDuc, “Opinion Change and Voting Behaviour in Referendums”, European Journal of 
Political Research, 41/6 (2002); L. LeDuc, “Referendums and Elections: How Do Campaigns Differ?” 
in Farrell & Schmitt-Beck (eds) Do Political Campaigns Matter? (Routledge 2002). 
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specific to referendums. It is a force that most new initiatives face. The other three 
reasons are more specific to referendums. 
 
Second, and more importantly for referendums, however, there are infinitely more 
ways to oppose a policy proposal than to support it. To paraphrase Tolstoy: happy 
voters are all alike, every unhappy voter is unhappy in his own way. Opposition to 
any given EU treaty can be (and usually is) based on any number of different and 
incompatible arguments; approval requires support of the overall package. In most 
European countries Euro-scepticism draws together a range of very different political 
forces and parties.10 A possible remedy is to ensure that the referendum entails a 
choice between two precise options: the European Movement in Denmark has 
suggested that if there is to be another referendum on the EU the options ought to be 
ratification of the new treaty or withdrawal from the EU.11  
 
Third, referendum campaigns feature their own dynamics, which have more in 
common with consultation process in large organisations than with electoral 
campaigns.12 As the campaign progresses an ever-expanding list of objections is 
conjured up. Perhaps more significantly, the ‘no’ camp is free to change the subject of 
the campaign, whether in terms of its substance or from questions of substance to 
matters of identity, principle or personality.  
 
Fourth, as Chirac justifiably feared, when a referendum (like a European Parliament 
election or a local election) takes place in the middle of a presidential or executive 
term, it might be used as a ‘second order’ election to register protest against the 
government.13 LeDuc’s survey of changes in opinion polls during referendum 
campaigns, which includes a range of cases from Europe, North America and 
Australia, suggests that referendums do indeed include entail an anti-government bias. 
Even when the government proposals are carried, the majorities in favour tend to 
decrease during the course of a (long) campaign.  
 
On the other hand, there are also a number of reasons why governing parties might 
choose to call a referendum in spite of the attendant risks. Although some parties are 
more committed to participatory democracy than others, party stances on European 
integration and how to ratify treaties are shaped not only by policy and ideological 
commitment, but also by tactical decisions related to party management, coalition 
politics and voters. In line with the literature on how and when parties use 
referendums, the main motives for most parties in the Nordic cases have been to 
manage divisions with a party or coalition, or to pursue a decision that runs counter to 
the whish of the parliamentary majority. Four broad patterns of decisions can be 
extracted from the comparative literature on referendums in general, and on European 
referendums in the Nordic countries in particular.  
 
                                                 
10 N. Sitter, “Euro-scepticism as Party Strategy”, Austrian Journal of Political Science, 23:3 (2003), 
239-35.  
11 In fact their suggestion also included dropping the four reservations that Denmark secured after its 
first rejection of the Maastricht Treaty and which have been incorporated into all subsequent 
agreements, Politikken 25/06/2007. 
12 I am grateful to Svein S. Andersen for this comparison, see also S. S. Andersen & T. R. Burns, 
Societal Decision-Making: Democratic Challenges to State Technocracy, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1992).  
13 K. Reif, “National Election Cycles and European Elections, 1979 and 1984”, Electoral Studies, 3:3 
(1984), 244-255. 
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First, a referendum may be mandatory, as per the constitution. This is not strictly 
speaking the sense in any of the Nordic countries. None of the four constitutions make 
referendums on the EU necessary, but the Danish one comes close by requiring near-
unanimity in parliament if a referendum is to be avoided on major decisions that 
involve delegation of sovereignty to international organisations (this was originally 
designed to make international cooperation easier than in the pre-1953 constitution: to 
permit transfers of sovereignty without a referendum). A.93 of the Norwegian 
Constitution requires a three-quarters majority in parliament for legislation that cedes 
sovereignty, but does not require referendums (however, under A.112 a two-thirds 
majority in two successive parliaments can amend the constitution, and thus change 
A.93 or permit accession to any given treaty). The Swedish and Finnish do not 
include such requirements. 
 
Second, a referendum may be initiated, or even forced, but the opposition parties in an 
effort to defeat government policy. In Norway and Denmark the super-majorities 
required for major decisions on participation in European integration make this 
considerably easier than in Finland and Sweden; though in the latter case a faction 
within the governing Social Democrats sought to use internal party rules to force an 
internal party referendum which in turn would compel the leadership to reverse its 
decision to opt for parliamentary approval of the Constitutional treaty.  
 
Third, a referendum may be initiated by the government, for a number of reasons. 
Bjørklund argues that although the non-mandatory referendum is principally a device 
of last resort of the minority, it may also serve as a tool for mediation or party 
management in the face of divisive issues or a ‘lighting rod for dissent’ that removes 
an issue form the party political arena.14 When the question of participation in 
European integration first came up in the 1960s it divided several Norwegian and 
Danish parties. For the Social Democrats in both countries, and for the Norwegian 
centre-right bloc, it was a matter of shifting the European question out of the 
parliamentary arena. The 1972 referendums fit into a broader pattern on what Morel 
(echoing Bjørklund) labels ‘mediation devices’ or ‘agenda devices’; i.e. the use of 
referendums as devices to manage differences within the governing parties and 
coalitions and to remove a divisive issue from the parliamentary agenda.15 Likewise, 
argues Setäla, the 1994 EU referendums in Norway, Sweden and Finland were “used 
by parties as a strategy to deal with divisions caused by the integration issue.”16 
Conversely, a faction within a party, or even a challenger for the party leadership, 
may use a call for a referendum as a move in internal party political games (as was the 
case in the Dutch Liberals’ decision to opt for a referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty).17 
                                                 
14 T. Bjørklund “The Demand for Referendum: When Does it Arise and when Does It Succeed?”,  
Scandinavian Political Studies, 5/3 (1982), pp.237-259. 
15 L. Morel, “Le choix du référendum: Leçons françaises: L’émergence d’un référendum politiquement 
obligatorie”, Third ECPR Conference, Budapest 8 – 10 September 2005; and “The Rise of Government 
Initiated Referendums in Consolidated Democracies”, in M. Mendelsohn & A. Parkins (eds), 
Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites and Deliberations in Referendum Campaigns (London: 
Palgrave, 2001). Morel’s other categories include the use of referendums to pass legislation, secure 
legitimacy for a new policy, or enhance the power of the head of government. 
16 M. Setäla, ‘Referendums in Western Europe: A Wave of Direct Democracy?’,  Scandinavian 
Political Studies, 22/4 (1999), pp.237-340. 
17 J. J. M. van Holstyen, “To Refer or Not to Refer, that’s the Question: On the First National 
Referendum in the Netherlands”, Third ECPR Conference, Budapest 8 – 10 September 2005. 
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Somewhat more exceptionally, governments may initiate referendums to circumvent 
or outmanoeuvre the parliamentary opposition, or to reverse or avoid a defeat in a 
parliamentary vote. The single Nordic example is the Danish referendum on the 
Single European Act in 1986, which was a consequence of the government’s failure to 
pass the bill in parliament.18 This may be considered an instance of a government 
opting for a referendum in order to lend legitimacy to a decision or to strengthen the 
party leader’s positions. In addition, the Swedish Social Democrats’ decision to call a 
referendum on EMU could be seen primarily as a consequence of their claim that the 
original EU referendum did not commit Sweden to EMU membership. Consequently, 
even thought accession to EMU was possible without a referendum, the party had 
more or less committed itself to holding one by splitting the EU/EMU decision into 
two separate decisions.  
 
Fourth, and finally, all the major parties may reach consensus on calling a 
referendum, whether for policy or tactical reasons. In Norway in the 1960s the 
Eurosceptic parties saw the referendum as a possible minority weapon, in Bjørklund’s 
terms, whereas Labour was initially divided on the question and wanted to avoid too 
close association with the Conservatives (who initially opposed a referendum, but had 
come to favour it by 1970).19 As the British and Dutch debates on whether the 
Constitutional Treaty warranted referendums showed, once one party promises a 
referendum other parties may follow for fear of losing votes at a subsequent election. 
In other words, if voters are receptive to one party’s demand for a referendum, this 
might have a contagion effect on other parties. Over time, to the extent that precedents 
are set that make (even advocacy of) deviation from the referendum path ever more 
costly, patterns of referendum-based decision-making on European integration may 
thus become institutionalised.  
 
The emergence of stable patterns of decision making about European integration – the 
institutionalisation of the use of referendums or of parliamentary approval of treaties – 
might be driven by any combination of these four reasons for governments calling a 
referendum. Like all rules and procedures even constitutions require a degree of 
interpreting, and once interpretations have been made (whether by the judiciary or 
elected politicians) they tend to set precedents. A minimal degree of consistency 
demands that if a decision had been put to a referendum, its reversal also warrants a 
referendum. However, whether the decision to use a referendum for EU accession is 
interpreted as setting a precedent or as a one-off decision that legitimises subsequent 
parliamentary decision-making is a matter of party politics. The central question is 
therefore whether the main parties in any given country more or less agree on the uses 
of instruments of direct democracy on European questions, or whether this is 
contested. In all four Nordic states some degree of consensus ahs been developed over 
time, although the party political contestation of ratification procedures still take place 
to varying extent in Norway, Denmark and Sweden.  
 
Perhaps the simplest explanation of institutionalisation (and the most credible rival to 
party-driven explanations) would be that voters come to expect referendums one they 
                                                 
18 P. Svensson, ‘Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and Union: A Critical 
Assessment of the Franklin Thesis’, European Journal of Political Research, 41/5 (2002), pp.733-750. 
19 Bjørklund “The Demand for Referendum”, p.249; H. Lund, “Høyre og den nye Europa-debatten”, in 
B. B. Knudsen (ed.), Den Nye Europa-debatten (Oslo: Cappelen 1989), p.119. 
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have been used on one or two occasions. Combined with Eurosceptic voters demand 
for referendums, this might prompt even pro-EU parties to call referendums for fear 
of loss of votes to their Euro-sceptic rivals. To be sure, the general rule in the Nordic 
countries has long been that voters are more Eurosceptic than the parties they elect, 
and that in some cases parliamentary majorities have favoured integration even when 
a plurality of voters has opposed it. Opinion poll data on support for European 
integration (see figure 1) suggests that this is not the case: there is little 
correspondence between the four countries’ variation in public support for European 
integration over the last two decades and their differences in the use of referendums. 
Of the three EU members, only Finland has seen a plurality of voters oppose 
European integration since the early 1990s. It is therefore tempting to infer that the 
variation in the Nordic countries’ use of referendums (and therefore ultimately their 
different degrees of participation in European integration) reflects differences in party 
competition rather than differences in public opinion. The rest of this paper therefore 
turns to party-based opposition to European integration and the demand for and 
politics of referendums.  
 
 
Figure 1  A) Pro-EU opinion   B) Pro-EU minus anti-EU opinion 
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Source: Sweden, Denmark and Finland: Eurobarometer (EU membership is a ‘good thing’); Norway: 
Statistics Norway data from the 1993-1999 Omnibus surveys (‘yes’ to membership if a referendum 
were held), and Sentio polls for Nationen published 2000-2005. 
 
 
Parties, Party Strategy and Euroscepticism 
 
Euroscepticism has played a remarkably significant role in the Scandinavian party 
politics compared to other West European states. Public opinion has been a constraint 
on governments’ European policy, rather than the underlying cause of the four 
countries’ different affiliation with the EU. Finland, for example, features the most 
pro-EU elite, despite relatively high levels of popular Euroscepticism; a development 
which Raunio puts down to consensus politics and party competition.20 On the other 
hand, some Eurosceptic parties, particularly in Norway, have been adept at mobilising 
voters at the time of referendums or in general elections when European question is 
salient.21 This discrepancy between public opinion and degrees of participation in 
                                                 
20 T. Raunio, ‘Hesitant Voters, Committed Elite: Explaining the Lack of Eurosceptic Parties in 
Finland’, European Integration, 27/4 (2005), pp.381-395. 
21 K. Hagen & U. Sverdrup, ‘Isfrontene tiner i synet på norsk EU-medlemskap’, Horizont 3 (2003), 
pp.12-27; A. Todal Jenssen & O. Listhaug, ‘Voter’s Decisions in the Nordic Referendums of 1994: The 
Importance of Party Cues”, in M. Mendelsohn & A. Parkins (eds), Referendum Democracy: Citizens, 
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European integration should of course come as no surprise given that the literature on 
government initiated non-mandatory referendums suggests that they are called for any 
number of reasons other than to consult the voters. The decisions to seek closer 
European integration and to ratify this by parliamentary vote or referendum have 
primarily been (and remain) a matter for the governing parties, often in cooperation 
with the opposition. 
 
The question of how to elaborate a stance on European integration has been met in 
very different ways by the political parties in the four countries, depending on the 
individual parties’ policy preferences and how they balance these preferences with the 
quest for other goals: office, votes, and the imperatives of internal party management. 
Borrowing from military and business studies, party strategy may be defined as the 
link between goals and their achievement or as a broad formula for how a party is 
going to compete; a combination of what its ends should be and by which means these 
should be pursued.22 If a political party is defined along Sartori’s lines as an 
organisation that seeks to propel its candidates into parliament, and usually 
government, in order to pursue specific policies,23 it follows that parties face four 
goals which are not always in complete harmony. In the classical party politics 
literature a party’s key aims were the pursuit of votes and office.24 Others have since 
added the pursuit of policy, which in turn shapes both coalition games and the pursuit 
of votes; and the importance of internal party management and organisational 
survival.25 The key problem is that maximising one goal may mean compromising on 
another, hence the dilemmas of party strategy.26 Even for parties which ideology or 
policy preferences predispose them to strong pro- or anti-EU stances, the quest for 
votes and participation in coalition government shape their actual positions.  
 
Each of these fours goals may impinge on a party’s decisions to demand, support or 
oppose the use of referendums for decisions about participation in European 
integration. The quest for votes, for example by mobilising Eurosceptic voters, or 
efforts to avoid a loss of votes, are but one of four broad concerns that are relevant as 
parties adopt positions on the procedures for ratification of EU treaties.27 Problems of 
party management in divided parties may tempt the leadership to advocate the use of 
                                                                                                                                            
Elites and Deliberations in Referendum Campaigns (London: Palgrave, 2001); M. Franklin, M. Marsh, 
L. McLaren, ‘Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of 
Maastricht’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32/4 (1994), 455-472.  
22 C. von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, (Berlin, Dümmlers Verlag 1832); the last part paraphrases M. 
Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors, (New York, The 
Free Press, 1980). 
23 G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 1976). 
24 A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York, Harper & Row, 1957); W. Riker, The 
Theory of Political Coalitions, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962). 
25 A. de Swaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation, (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1973); I. Budge & 
M. J. Laver, “Office Seeking and Policy Pursuit in Coalition Theory”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 
11:4 (1986), 485-506; A. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
26 K. Strom, ‘A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties’, The American Journal of Political 
Science 34:2 (1990), 565–598; W. C. Müller & K. Strom, “Political Parties and Hard Choices”, in 
Müller & Strom (eds), Policy, Office or Votes? How Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
27 M. Qvortrup,, “The Revolt of the Masses or Elites? Three Referendums on the European 
Constitution Treaty in 2005”, School of Economics and Political Sciences Working Papers, GOV2205-
5, the University of Sydney, 2005. 
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referendums, in order to manage dissent or to remove the question from the party 
arena. Factions within a party, or challengers for the party leadership, may use the 
European question as part of broader intra-party political competition. Policy goals or 
ideological commitments may pull a party towards advocacy of referendums on 
European questions for at least three different reasons: in order to defeat a particular 
treaty; as part of a broad and principled stance against European integration; or 
because of the party’s commitment to direct democracy or participatory and 
deliberative politics. Finally, parties that take part in a governing coalition that is 
made up of both pro-EU and Eurosceptic parties may be under pressure to take steps 
to ‘quarantine’ the European question; to accommodate the Eurosceptic parties’ 
demand for a referendum or to remove the question from the parliamentary arena in 
order to preserve coalition. 
 
Yet there is little or no reason to expect parties to deal with these (possibly 
conflicting) incentives in the same way. How parties adapt and change depends on 
their organisation and preferences, and on how they interpret challenges, almost as 
much as on the actual challenges. Some are more immune to contagion from their 
competitors than others. Whereas most of the large centre-right and -left parties have 
faced strong incentives to adapt to their competitors’ strategies, whether in the form of 
contagion from the left in the shape of successful social democrat parties or the catch-
all parties on the centre-right, others have proven more resistant.28 Katz & Mair find 
that many catch-all parties are becoming more modern ‘cartel’ parties, but point out 
that these parties face challenges by for example protest parties.29 Many parties have 
found the catch-all model difficult to imitate, or rejected it. This applies to 
communists and greens on the left, agrarian and denominational parties in the centre, 
and new populist parties on the right. These alternatives are a matter of strategy as 
much as party organisation. Even if, over time, most parties may employ more full 
time professional party officials, rely more on public funding and less on activist mass 
memberships, or use the media and pollsters more extensively, it does not necessarily 
follow that they abandon their strategies of interest representation or protest. In other 
words, even if party organisations and tactics converge, strategies for competition 
remain different if some parties decide not to attempt to catch all of the electorate. 
 
Three ideal-type party strategies for competition can be extracted from the literature 
on government-opposition competition in West European politics, and these strategies 
shape parties’ stances on European question.30 This is largely a question of the party’s 
                                                 
28 Duverger, Political Parties; L. D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, (London, Pall 
Mall Press, 1967); O. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of West European Party Systems”, in J. 
LaPalombara & M. Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1966. 
29 R. Katz & P. Mair (eds), How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in 
Western Democracies, (London, Sage Books, 1994); R. Katz & P. Mair, “Changing Models of Party 
Organisation and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, 1:1 (1995), 5-
28.; R. Katz & P. Mair, “The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in 
Twentieth-Century Democracies” and .S. B. Wolinetz, “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the 
Study of Parties and Party Organisation in Contemporary Democracies”, both in R. Gunther & J. R. 
Montero/Juan J. Linz (eds.): Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges, (Oxford Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
30 See e.g. R. A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1966); J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political 
Development, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966); and on the EU, N. Sitter, “The Politics of 
Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro-scepticism a Government-Opposition 
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position in the party system, relative to its competitors. First, competition along the 
central left-right dimension entails gaining sufficient strength to define this dimension 
(or aligning along it). This is the left vs. right dimension in West European politics, 
shaped by first by mass parties and later by the catch-all parties. However, a number 
of parties have chosen to appeal to a specific constituency based on interest and/or 
values, drawing draws on peripheries’ defence of economic interest, culture, values or 
political autonomy in the face of central administration.31 This often means appealing 
across the main dimension, and therefore a second strategy that emphasises policy 
over vote maximisation, in contrast to the catch-all parties. Third, several parties have 
sought to circumvent the central left-right dimension, challenging the regime, the 
central elite ‘cartel’, or the entire political debate, from the flanks.32 Focus on the 
origins of parties (rather than ‘families’) helps prevent problematic classifications of 
for example the Scandinavian protestant Christian parties as continental-style 
Christian democrats. Although parties can and do change, and may transcend their 
original aims and organisation, a degree of continuity characterises most parties. 
Parties’ origins and identity therefore tends to shape debates on how they should 
respond to new questions such as European integration (see table 3, appendix). 
 
Turning to the Nordic party systems, the most striking feature is the lack of party-
based Euroscepticism among the mainstream conservative and social democratic 
parties. All the catch-all parties which compete along the main left-right dimension 
favour EU membership. The conservative parties have advocated EU membership 
since the 1960s.33 The social democrats have been more divided, but broadly in 
favour of membership since the 1960s in Denmark and Norway and since the end of 
the Cold War in Sweden and Finland.34 Broadly speaking, the catch-all parties have 
been the drivers of the Nordic countries’ quest for participation in European 
integration. An overview of current and former party positions is presented in table 3. 
 
The centre parties’ record on European integration is more mixed, but in the three EU 
member states they had all turned pro-EU by the end of the 1990s.35 The Danish 
Liberals and the People’s Party in Sweden have pro-EU traditions dating back to the 
1970s, whereas the Norwegian Liberals has an equally long Eurosceptic tradition. The 
Finnish and Swedish agrarian Centre parties converted to pro-EU positions more 
recently, and more ambiguously.36 The Danish Christian Democrats (which are no 
                                                                                                                                            
Dynamic?”, West European Politics, 24:4 (2001), 22-39; and “Euro-scepticism as Party Strategy”, 
Austrian Journal of Political Science, 23:3 (2003), 239-35. 
31 S. Rokkan & D. Urwin (eds), The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism, 
(London, Sage Publications, 1982); S. Rokkan & D. Urwin, Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of 
West European Peripheries, (London, Sage, 1983).  
32 P. Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western Europe”, West European Politics, 18:1 (1995), 34-51. 
33 L. Svåsand & U. Lindström, ‘Scandinavian Parties and the European Union’, in J. Gaffney (ed.), 
Political Parties and the European Union, (London: Routledge, 1996). 
34 J. Saglie, ‘Between Opinion Leadership and ‘Contract of Disagreement’: The Norwegian Labour 
Party and the European issue (1988-1994)’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 23/2 (2000), pp.93-113; R. 
Geyer & D. Swank, ‘Rejecting the European Union: Norwegian Social Democratic Opposition to the 
EU in the 1990s’, Party Politics, 3/4 (1997), pp.459-562.  
35 For more detailed analysis, cast in terms of ‘hard’ (principled) and ‘soft’ (contingent) opposition to 
integration, see A. Szczerbiak & P. Taggart (eds), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics 
of Euroscepticism, two volumes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
36 A. Batory & N. Sitter, ‘Cleavages, Competition, and Coalition-building: Agrarian Parties and the 
European Question in Western and Eastern Europe’, The European Journal of Political Research, 43/3 
(2004), pp.521-544. 
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longer represented in parliament) have generally been pro-EU, but opposed both 
EMU and the Constitutional Treaty, before changing again to favour the Reform 
Treaty; the Swedish and Finnish parties changed from Eurosceptic to pro-EU (the 
Swedish party also endorsing EMU).37 In contrast, the three Norwegian centre parties 
remain opposed to EU membership: the Christian People’s Party and the Liberals 
more cautiously; the agrarian Centre Party more resolutely (it also opposed the EEA). 
 
Apart from the Norwegian Centre party, the strongest opposition to European 
integration can be found at the flanks of the Nordic party systems. Perhaps 
predictably, given the EU’s focus on free trade and competition, the socialist left has 
traditionally opposed European integration. Indeed, some of the left flank parties were 
born as anti-EU or -NATO dissenters from the mainstream social democrat left, much 
as the Christian parties were born as dissent against the secularising and socially 
permissive mainstream consensus.38 However, the Danish Socialist People’s Party has 
recently become more pro-EU, as part and parcel of an overall modification if its left-
wing outlook; and in Finland the Left and Green League have turned neutral and 
accept EU membership.39 The far right has been less cohesive: the Danish and 
Finnish parties conform to the West European pattern of far right Euroscepticism, but 
the Norwegian Progress Party is caught between populism and its advocacy of free 
markets and has downgraded its pro-EU stance to ambivalence. Like the short-lived 
New Democrats in Sweden, the Norwegian party advocated EU membership in 1994. 
 
To the extent that political parties take an instrumental approach to referendums, and 
seek to use referendums for tactical rather than principles reasons, this pattern of 
suggests that some Nordic parties should demand referendums for each of the major 
decisions on European integration. The pro-EU parties may be expected to seek to 
avoid referendums if and when there is a pro-EU majority in parliament, if only to 
avoid the risk of defeat. The exceptions is when a pro-EU party leadership seeks to 
use the referendums to shift an issue off the parliamentary arena for reasons linked to 
party or coalition management; or Eurosceptic factions use internal party ruled to 
force a referendum. By a similar logic, Eurosceptic parties may be expected to 
demand referendums, particularly when they are in opposition. The British debate 
about ratification of the Reform Treaty illustrates the point perfectly. Parties that are 
severely divided or uncertain on European questions may also be expected to demand 
referendums, if only as a means of shifting an awkward issue away from the party 
political arena. The main exception to this rule depends on the idea that the main 
concern for divided parties is that the issue is not politicised: as long as there is broad 
cross-party consensus, a parliamentary decision might also be sufficient to remove an 
issue from party politics.  
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This pattern of party-based Euroscepticism means that one or more parties have 
opposed every decision on closer participation in European integration. At almost 
every junction, one or more parties have demanded referendums. However, two 
developments in the 1990s brought about considerable change in party competition on 
the European question. In Sweden and Finland the social democrat and agrarian 
parties’ adoption of pro-EU platforms in the early 1990s were followed by other 
centre and left wing parties’ reassessment of their stances on European integration. 
Meanwhile, in Denmark, the ‘no’ vote in 1992 Maastricht referendum prompted a 
national pact that comprised most political parties and secured a ‘yes’ in the second 
referendum a year later. A similar approach based on cross-party consensus was 
agreed for the 2005 referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. The next three sections 
turn to each series of referendums, exploring the party politics behind them and the 
outcomes. 
 
 
The Politics of European Referendums 
 
The question of EU membership first came up in Scandinavia when the UK 
announced its application for EEC membership in 1961, barely a year after the 
establishment of the European Free Trade Area. Denmark (and Ireland) soon followed 
the UK’s lead, while Norway’s minority Labour government prevaricated until 
French president De Gaulle vetoed the EEC enlargement.40 France’s second veto in 
1967 probably saved the next government, a non-socialist coalition, from collapse.41 
Tage Erlander, Sweden’s Social Democrat prime minister, rejected participation in 
European integration as incompatible with neutrality and problematic for the welfare 
state, although the centre-right parties looked more favourably on membership.42 
Finland’s precarious position between East and West precluded seriously considering 
EEC membership. De Gaulle’s departure from French politics in 1969 revived the 
question, polarising Norwegian and Danish party politics, and culminating in the 
Danish ‘yes’ and Norwegian ‘no’ in 1972. The Swedish Social Democrati 
government, now led by Olof Palme, reiterated its rejection of EEC membership, 
again principally with reference to neutrality and solidarity with Finland. Debates 
about sovereignty and economics were thus played down. Consequently, once 
neutrality became obsolete in 1990 the Swedish and Finnish centre-left moved swiftly 
to advocate EU membership.43 
 
The decisions to hold referendums on EU membership were relatively uncontroversial 
in all four countries, and more or less voluntary. They were effectively taken in 
Denmark and Norway in the 1960s, long before the actual referendums. The 
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Norwegian parties agreed as early as 1962 that the question of EEC membership 
would be decided by referendum. In the winter of 1961-62 it looked uncertain 
whether a twenty-five percent minority of MPs might be mobilised to block EEC 
membership, and consensus emerged that the issue should ultimately be settled by 
referendum.44 The Socialist People’s Party and the Centre Party wanted a referendum 
because they feared they might not be able to bloc accession in parliament; the 
divided Liberals favoured one as a means of avoiding a split (which the 1972 
referendum precipitated anyway), and the ruling Labour party eventually adopted a 
similar logic.45 All parties have since agreed that a referendum is necessary to reverse 
the 1972 decision not to join the EEC.46  
 
Although the Danish constitution includes provisions for mandatory referendums, 
accession to the EEC could have been accomplished without referendums if a five-
sixths majority in parliament voted in favour. Whether the Danish referendum should 
count as voluntary or obligatory is ambiguous. The decision to apply for membership 
in 1961 was supported by the required five-sixths majority of MPs, but a referendum 
was seen as a useful device to ensure that a general election would not turn into an 
‘EEC election’.47 When the centre-right government decided in May 1971 to call a 
referendum on EEC accession, the prime minister’s party (the Radical Liberals) was 
divided and an election was due. As all the major parties wanted a referendum, 
whether the September election returned enough Eurosceptic MPs to form a blocking 
minority would only shape the procedure for calling a referendum.48 The Social 
Democrats, who won the election, had promised one in any case. As it turned out, the 
1972 referendum was technically obligatory, because the general election changed the 
balance of power and the decision to join the EEC was approved by less than a five-
sixths majority, or 150 votes in the 179-member Folketing. The result was 141 to 34, 
including 12 Social Democrats voting against their own government.49 Bjørklund 
therefore characterised it as “a voluntary referendum as a result of a tactical 
manoeuvre”.50  
  
The Norwegian and Danish referendums in the 1970s set the patterns for Norway, 
Sweden and Finland two decades later. The Norwegian government had no real 
choice, partly because of the 1972 precedent, and partly because it might not secure a 
three-quarters majority in parliament in the event that the Eurosceptic parties 
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performed well in the 1993 election (which they did). In Sweden the governing Social 
Democrats were initially ambivalent, but in 1990 all the other parties favoured a 
referendum. In Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson’s own account, divisions in the party 
and the conviction that a general election could not settle the question tipped the 
balance.51 The four pro-EU parties reached agreement on the procedure in 1991. The 
government proceeded to argue that the referendum was on accession to the EU, 
without an obligation to join Economic and Monetary Union, and later reported that 
this position was minuted in negotiating meetings with the EU.52 The Finnish 
government’s decision should be seen in the light of the referendums in the two other 
countries. Suksi notes this influence, but predicts that the use of advisory referendums 
will remain extremely rare.53 The governing Centre Party joined the ranks of the pro-
EU parties, but only after its leader Prime Minister Esko Aho threatened to resign if 
his divided party did not adopt a pro-EU stance. He is rated as the “only person who 
widely influenced people’s opinion” on the issue.54 
 
The most controversial decisions were not whether to hold referendums in 1994, but 
the sequence in which they were to be held. In 1972, both the Norwegian and Danish 
governments had hoped to hold their referendum after the other, in order to enjoy a 
‘pull’ effect’. In the end they failed to reach an agreement, and the Norwegians voted 
first, on September 24th and 25th, followed by the Danes on October 2nd.55 In 1994, the 
running order put the Finnish referendum first on October 16th, the Swedes second on 
November 13th, and the Norwegians third on November 28th. All three would follow 
the widely predicted ‘yes’ in Austria, and critics argued (with considerably 
plausibility) that the whole process was designed to engineer an Austro-Finnish ‘pull’ 
effect towards as Swedish ‘yes’, and an even stronger ‘Swedish’ pull in Norway.56 In 
the end the latter did not materialise, at least not to the extent many pro-membership 
campaigners hoped.  
 
Meanwhile, however, Sweden, Finland and Norway had joined the European 
Economic Area without much controversy, let alone referendums. Yet this was a 
major step in terms of European integration: the new EEA states accepted the relevant 
Acquis Communautaire and effectively committed themselves to accepting new 
relevant EU laws; established a new supranational authority (the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority) with supervisory powers comparable to those of the Commission; and 
agreed to abide by the relevant rulings of the European Court of Justice and the new 
EFTA Court. For Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein it would remain an alternative 
basis for association with the EU; a kind of ‘quasi-membership’.57  However, at the 
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time the three governments ratified the EEA treaty in 1992 negotiations for full 
membership were well underway. The pro-EU parties therefore saw the agreement as 
a stepping-stone to full membership, while some Eurosceptics accepted it as an 
alternative to EU membership. In Norway only the Socialist Left and the Centre Party 
opposed the EEA, but the Liberals, the Christian People’s Party and the Progress 
Party joined their call for a referendum.58 In Sweden the Centre Party was ambivalent, 
but only the Greens and Communists (which became the Left Party) actually opposed 
EEA membership.59 Likewise, in Finland only twelve MPs voted against the EEA 
treaty when it was ratified in parliament.60 The Social Democrats, Conservatives and 
the Swedish Peoples Party had adopted pro-EU positions as early as 1991, the Centre 
followed suit in June 1994, the Greens and the Communists were divided, and only 
the small Christian and Rural parties opposed European integration.61 
 
Although all four countries held referendums on accession to the EU, the three 
member states have taken different paths as far as further integration is concerned. 
Most Finnish parties adopted a broad interpretation of the mandate given in the 1994 
referendum, which was assumed to include both participation in EMU and a mandate 
for parliament to enact further treaty changes. In Sweden, the decision to de-couple 
EU and EMU membership made another referendum likely, but far from certain. In 
Denmark the decision to call a referendum in 1986 reflected the government’s 
difficulty in securing majority support for the SEA at all; whereas the first Maastricht 
referendums was obligatory because the parliamentary majority was less that the five-
sixths required by the constitution for transfers of sovereignty. In contrast the second 
Maastricht referendum was not obligatory, but a political necessity, and set the scene 
for further referendums on successive transfers of power to the EU. As a rule, 
therefore, whether to use referendums is the government’s call, but in some cases it is 
freer to choose than in others.  
 
The Danish decision to go down the referendum path in 1986 was primarily a device 
for a minority government to secure passage of legislation, which worked admirably. 
The minority government consisting of the Conservatives, Liberals, Centre Democrats 
and Christian People’s Party generally relied on the support of the far right Progress 
Party and the Radical Liberals, but the latter defected to the opposition on the vote on 
the Single European Act and the government was defeated. A referendum was chosen 
as an alternative to fresh elections, and the Social Democrats and Radical Liberals –  
both of which were divided on the actual use of a referendum –  agreed to abide by 
the voters’ verdict.62 
 
At the next European juncture the Maastricht bill passed with 130 votes to 25, 
opposed only by the Socialist People’s Party and Progress Party parts of the Christian 
People’s Party, but like the 1972 bill its support fell short of the required 150 votes 
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and triggered a referendum.63 However, it was also argued that the two earlier 
referendums had set a precedent and that, despite the debates in parliament, even the 
first Maastricht referendum “was never seriously questioned because the voters 
expected it”.64 In any case, after the first ‘no’ another referendum became a political 
necessity. Because there was no ‘Plan B’ in place to deal with one state’s failure to 
ratify a treaty, the now ubiquitous Danish op-outs were agreed at the Edinburgh 
summit: opt-outs from EMU, common citizenship, defence, and supranational 
decisions in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. The participation of Eurosceptic 
parties in negotiating this deal secured a ‘yes’ in the second referendum, in May 1993. 
The Edinburgh agreement was supported by all parties but the Progress Party, and 
thus brought a degree of elite consensus that had not been seen since the 1960s. 
Therefore, although treaty ratification would now pass with more than 150 votes 
(which precluded a referendum being called), a separate bill was passed to use a non-
binding referendum in 1993. This set the scene for future use of referendums and 
cross-party compromise on the procedures for ratification.  
 
The main parties prepared for the use of the same mechanism for the referendums on 
Amsterdam in 1998 and EMU in 2000, which they found to have implications in 
terms of transfer of sovereignty. Hence Buch & Hansen’s assertion that “the reason 
for submitting the European issue [to referendums] should, therefore, be seen not as a 
consequence of strictly legal reasons, but rather as a consequence of political 
reasons.”65 As it turned out the 1998 election gave parties opposed to the Amsterdam 
treaty – the Progress Party, Socialist People’s Party, Danish People’s Party and the 
Unity List – a blocking minority; and in 2000 the Christian People’s Party joined 
them in opposition to the Euro. However, when it came to Nice the main parties 
argues that no referendum was needed because the treaty did not involve a transfer of 
sovereignty, and the Justice department confirmed this.66  However, the Danish 
parliament has parliament has approved transfers of sovereignty under article 20 
without recourse to referendum on three occasions: once on air traffic control, and 
twice relating to European patents.67 
 
Sweden had neither the need for referendums that the Danish government had in 
1986, nor the constitutional requirement for them for transfers of sovereignty.  
Referendums were not deemed necessary for ratification of the Amsterdam and Nice 
treaties, which the Social Democrat government could secure in parliament and the 
centre-right parties supported. However, EMU became a special case. The 
government had left the question open in 1994, maintaining only that the decision 
would be taken at a later stage. When the Social Democrats eventually opted for EMU 
membership, partly to circumvent internal divisions and partly to accommodate the 
small Eurosceptic parties, their use of a consultative referendum was supported by all 
                                                 
63 P. Svensson, ‘The Danish Yes to Maastricht and Edinburgh: The EC Referendum of May 1993’, 
Scandinavian Political Studies, 17/1 (1994), pp.69-82. 
64 K. Siune, ‘The Danish NO to the Maastricht Treaty: The Danish EC Referendum of June 1992’, 
Scandinavian Political Studies, 16/1 (1993), pp.93-103, p.94. 
65 Buch & Hansen, ‘The Danes and Europe’, p.8. 
66 Redegørelse for visse forfatningsretlige spørgsmål i forbindelse med Danmarks ratification af Nice-
traktaten, (Copenhagen: Ministry of Justice, 2001), p.48. 
67 Folketingets EU-oplysning, ‘Danske folkeafstemninger om EU’, EU Baggrund, no 3 (2002). 
Nick Sitter, 2007, p.20  
parties except the conservative Moderates.68 In the run-up to the vote, when a ‘no’ 
looked likely, Prime Minister Göran Persson questioned the decision to put the issue 
to a popular vote in the first place.69 As in Denmark, the outcome was ‘no’. 
 
In contrast to the Swedes and Danes, Finnish governments have opted not to hold 
further referendums on European integration. Raunio points to the consensual style of 
politics in general and foreign policy in particular, with a strong national coordination 
system on EU policy, combined with a fragmented party system that encourages 
compromise and candidate-centred elections that link Euroscepticism to individuals 
rather than parties, as the key factors that make for a broad cross-party consensus on 
European policy.70 Even the Greens and the Left League performed U-turns, and 
decided in 1997 and 1998 respectively to support Finnish participation in EMU 
(though some of their MPs dissented). Although the Centre Party was against EMU, it 
decided that it would accept the decision of the parliamentary majority and not seek to 
overturn it in the future. EMU was approved by a 135 to 65 vote in parliament in 
1998. 
 
Given the history of referendums on European integration in Denmark, the broad 
cross-party agreement to hold a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty came as no 
surprise. The five ‘old’ parties agreed a ‘national compromise’ that involved both the 
decision to call a referendum and to recommend a ‘yes’ vote, and the decision was 
adopted in February 2005 after the election. This mirrored the broad cross-party 
agreement on the second Maastricht referendum, but excluded the hard Eurosceptic 
parties on the far left (the Unity list) and right (the Danish People’s Party). The 
Christian Democrats also came out against the compromise in the most marginal of 
decisions in September 2004, when its governing body votes 24-23 not to participate 
in the national compromise, citing excessive majority decision-making in the EU, 
opposition to the changes to the Presidency, and the lack of reference to Christian 
values. However, the party fell below the threshold for representation in the February 
2005 election, and consequently change leadership and gradually reverted to a pro-EU 
stance. When the Socialist People’s Party decided on November 6th 2004 to agree the 
compromise with the Liberals, Conservatives, Social Democrats and Radical Liberals, 
the deal was hailed as a historic compromise.71 The Socialist People’s Party members 
subsequently endorsed the party’s new ‘yes’ position by an overwhelming 3,130 votes 
to 1,774. By the time the Danish parliament set the date, the government had thus not 
only secured broad support for the decision to call a referendum; Prime Minister 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen was credited with having built a solid coalition behind 
Danish EU policy that came close to the ubiquitous five-sixth base in parliament.72 
However, the referendum results from France and the Netherlands prompted 
suspension of the ratification process. At the time of writing the Danish government’s 
strategy for the Reform Treaty had yet to be determined: the treaty agreed in principle 
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at the June 2007 summit EU explicitly did not include the nine points that the Danish 
Ministry of Justice had argued (in 2004) triggered the A.20 procedure.  
 
Like the Danes, the Finnish governing parties opted to stick to what was rapidly 
becoming an established pattern; in this case a pattern of parliamentary ratification of 
EU treaties. The decision was relatively swift, if somewhat more controversial than in 
Denmark. The governing parties, the Centre, Social Democrats and Swedish People’s 
Party, and the main opposition, the Conservatives, all decided individually that there 
was no need for a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. In the autumn of 2003, 
they agreed that the threshold for referendums should be kept high, and that the 
Constitutional Treaty would not meet this threshold.73 The Foreign Affairs Committee 
concluded in September 2003 that the draft constitution did not warrant a referendum. 
When the government bill on the Finnish position in negotiations was passed in 
October 2003, an amendment supported by the Greens, the True Finns and a few 
Christian Democrats that called for a referendum was defeated by 141 to 36 votes. 
But the consensus was by no means as complete as it was in Denmark: the Christian 
Democrats decided in November 2004 to demand a referendum, and in February 2005 
a quarter of the Finnish MPs (including some Social Democrats and Centre MPs) 
signed a motion calling for a referendum. As it turned out, the plans for ratification by 
parliament in the autumn of 2005 were shelved after the June summit, and replaced by 
a government report on the Constitutional Treaty. The treaty was eventually ratified 
by the Finnish parliament in December 2006, by 125 to 39 votes. 
 
The Swedish government’s decision not to call a referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty proved far more controversial. Among the parliamentary parties, only the 
Greens and Left Party demand a referendum. However, the two parties provided the 
political support for the Social Democrat minority government in what was almost an 
informal coalition. Moreover, the Eurosceptic June List, which polled almost 15% and 
came third in the 2004 European Parliament elections, demanded a referendum and 
threatened to enter a list for the 2006 general elections. By the autumn of 2004 the 
organisation established to push for a referendum, Folkomröstning.nu, was heading 
towards to 100,000 signatures. Critics argued that the treaty would amount to a 
constitutional change, and therefore required at the very least two parliamentary 
decisions with an intervening election. However, Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds 
argued in parliament, after judicial consultation, that the changes could be 
accommodated by a normal parliamentary vote.74 Therefore, despite considerable 
debate in the press and within the Social Democrat and Centre parties, a broad cross-
party agreement was reached by all expect the Greens and the Left in December 2004, 
to the effect that there would not be a referendum. However, in the spring of 2005 
Social Democrat Eurosceptics planned a campaign to force the party to change its 
position on the referendum, which would entail five percent of the party’s members 
(some 7000) demanding an internal party referendum on the question and then 
winning it.75 As it turned out, of course, French voters put a premature end to the 
debate (faintly echoing DeGaulle’s intervention in the 1960s debates in Scandinavia). 
As in Denmark, the decision was put on hold. The June List nevertheless decided to 
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compete in the September 2006 election on the grounds that no referendum had been 
promised. It polled less than 0.5% of the vote, in a clear indication that the 
government hardly alienated voters by not opting for a referendum.76 
 
Meanwhile, in Norway, the debate over a third application for EU membership 
continued below the political surface, and it developed into a minor controversy over 
how many referendums should be held. Formally, the question was effectively put on 
ice for the duration of the 2001-2005 parliament by the ‘suicide clause’ that the 
Conservatives, Liberals and Christian People’s Party coalition agreed before taking 
office in 2001: the coalition would be terminated if the pro-EU Conservatives put the 
EU issue on the agenda. However, in 2001 the soft Eurosceptic Christian People’s 
Party adopted the position that two referendums would be warranted: one on whether 
to apply and one to ratify the deal after negotiations were concluded. This was seen as 
a more neutral stance, since it would permit uncertain voters to vote ‘yes’ the first 
time without committing themselves. In April 2005 the party leadership’s view was 
defeated by the more Eurosceptic activists, and the Christian People’s Party reverted 
to the one-referendum strategy. In the meantime, however, the neutral Progress Party 
and the divided but formally Eurosceptic Liberals came to favour this double-
referendum solution. On the other hand, both the two main pro-EU parties (Labour 
and the Conservatives) and the hard Eurosceptics (the Centre Party and the Socialist 
Left) strongly oppose it, wanting only a single referendum. All this manoeuvring may 
have been somewhat premature, as the 2005 election propelled a ‘red-green’ collation 
of Labour, the Centre and Socialist Left into office and they adopted a similar ‘suicide 
clause’ to quarantine the EU question for 2005-2009.77 
 
 
To Structure Political Conflict – Free to Choose? 
 
By the late 2000s, a pattern of European referendums has become discernible across 
the Nordic countries. Danish voters have more or less come to expect them, and the 
parties seek to reach agreement both on whether to hold referendums and, 
increasingly, on the recommendations they put to voters. Successive Finnish 
governments have decided that they do not need to use referendums to ratify further 
European integration, and have found broad cross-party consensus. By contrast, the 
pattern in Sweden is less institutionalised. The conservative and social democrat 
parties are sceptical about the use of referendums. The decisions to use referendums 
for EU accession and EMU were exceptional, and the latter was questioned both at 
the time and after the ‘no’ vote. Moreover, the EMU outcome cannot have done much 
to warm the pro-EU parities to the referendum as a decision-making device. 
Meanwhile the Norwegian parties remain a long way from having to face such 
decisions, as the 2005 election saw the centre-left agree another cease-fire on the EU 
issue.  
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In almost every case, the motives for using referendums have been mixed. The desire 
to circumvent a divisive issue or to avoid fighting a general election on the EU 
question has been a powerful force behind most decisions to call referendums, but in 
Denmark the constitutional requirement for a super-majority on decisions that involve 
a transfer of sovereignty has helped push successive governments towards 
referendums. Both in Denmark and elsewhere, a few decisions on whether to ratify 
treaties or major decisions on European integration seem to have promoted a degree 
of institutionalisation. The tactical use of a referendum in 1986 helped establish a 
pattern of EU-referendums to an extent not seen elsewhere, even if many of the 
subsequent referendums turned out to be obligatory as Eurosceptic parties controlled 
more than a sixth of the seats in parliament. Given the erratic experience in the Nordic 
countries, which has included five defeats to six wins for the governments’ pro-EU 
position, there is little reason to expect the Finnish, Swedes or Norwegian 
governments to desire more referendums than is necessary. In the Norwegian case it is 
a political necessity, but the recent Swedish debates indicate that the political parties 
are deciding that the costs of calling EU referendums for internal party political 
motives may be considerably higher than the gains.  
 
Most political parties have acted in accordance with the hypothesis that it is a party’s 
stance on European integration that determines whether it demands a referendum. 
Pro-EU parties seek top avoid referendums on European integration, unless questions 
of party or coalition management makes it imperative. The only case of united, pro-
EU party voluntarily calling for a referendum is the Norwegian Progress Party when 
accession to the European Economic Area was debated: a rare case of a populist party 
putting its commitment to direct democracy above its European policy. Eurosceptic 
parties have, as a rule, demanded referendums. The significant exception is the 
Finnish Centre Party on the EMU question: a rare case of a party putting its 
commitment to representative decision-making above its European policy. For most 
of the Nordic Eurosceptic parties there has been no dilemma. Unlike the UK 
conservatives (who are more committed to exclusively representative decision 
making), most of the Nordic Eurosceptic parties also share a commitment to direct 
and participatory democracy. It is the divided but pro-EU parties that have faced a 
dilemma between European policy and their preferences for representative and direct 
democracy: several divided parties and parties that take part in coalitions that are 
divided on the European issue have favoured the use of referendums for mainly 
tactical reasons. Over time, this has narrowed their options. 
 
The history and politics of European referendums in the Nordic countries suggests 
that while the Nordic political parties may once have been relatively free to choose 
whether to use referendums or not for major decisions on European integration, they 
are now less free to choose. The paths chosen at the first three or four junctures have 
shaped the political parties options in the face of further treaty ratifications. Thee 
mechanisms seem to be at work in the Nordic cases. First, there is a matter of parties’ 
commitment to consistent strategies. Once accession to the EU or one of its policy 
areas has been ratified by referendum, it is very difficult politically for a party to opt 
for parliamentary ratification. The EMU question in Sweden is the most subtle case in 
point: having argued that the accession referendum did not commit the country to 
EMU, the Social Democrats had to call a referendum on EMU despite their clear 
reluctance to do so. Second, once referendums have been used to ratify European 
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questions, it is easy for a party to demand that they be used again and invoke the 
threat that voters might punish pro-EU governing parties that opt for parliamentary 
ratification. However, there is no evidence that the Swedish and Finnish governing 
parties were thus punished in the 2006 and 2007 elections. Third, and more 
significantly, institutionalisation may be a matter of all the mainstream parties 
actively seeking to build a consensus on the politics of European treaty ratification. 
This has been the case in Denmark and Finland, with opposite outcomes, and similar 
processes are also at work in Norway and Sweden. Yet the fact that two successive 
Swedish governments have opted for parliamentary ratification of the Constitutional 
and Reform Treaty, and that the Danish government is considering it, shows that even 
institutionalisation is contingent on party political choice. In short, the Nordic cases 
suggest that political parties in representative democracies enjoy considerable power 
to structure political conflicts, or to determine the appropriate arena for decision-
making. Once procedures for direct democracy have been invoked for decisions on 
participation European integration, turning back to the parliamentary road is more 
difficult. But it is not impossible.  
Nick Sitter, 2007, p.25  
 
Appendix: Table 3 – Nordic Parliamentary (and some ex-parliamentary) Parties. 
Eurosceptic parties in bold, formerly Eurosceptic parties underlined, percentage of 
votes in last election in brackets. 
Party family 
and dimension 
of opposition 
 
Finland  
(2007 election) 
Sweden  
(2006 election) 
Denmark 
(2005 election) 
Norway  
(2005 election) 
     
Far, socialist 
left and greens: 
new politics 
 
 
 
Left League – 
VAS (8.8) 
 
Green League 
– VIHR (8.5) 
Left Party – 
Vp (5.9) 
 
Swedish 
Greens – Mp 
(5.2) 
Unity List – E 
(3.4) 
 
Socialist 
People’s Party 
– SF (6.0) 
Socialist Left 
– SV (8.8) 
 
Social 
democrat: 
socio-
economic left-
right 
 
 
 
Social 
Democrats – 
SDP (21.4) 
 
Social 
Democrats – 
SAP (35.0) 
 
Social 
Democrats – 
SD (25.9) 
 
Labour – DNA 
(32.7) 
Centre 
(Christian, 
liberal, 
agrarian): 
territorial 
and/or socio-
economic left-
right 
 
 
Centre Party – 
KESK (23.1) 
 
Christian 
Democrats – 
KD (4.9) 
 
Swedish 
People’s Party 
– SFS (4.6) 
 
Centre Party – 
C (7.9) 
 
Christian 
Democrats – 
KD (6.6) 
 
Liberals – FpL 
(7.5) 
*Radical 
Liberals – RV 
(9.2) 
 
 
*Liberals – V 
(29.0) 
Centre Party 
– Sp (6.5) 
 
Liberals – V 
(5.9) 
 
Chr. People’s 
Party – KrF 
(6.8) 
 
Conservative: 
socio-
economic left-
right 
 
 
Conservatives 
– KOK (22.3) 
 
 
Moderates – M 
(26.2) 
 
Conservatives 
– KF (10.3) 
 
Conservatives 
– H  (14.1) 
Far right: new 
populism 
 
 
 
True Finns –  
PeruS (4.1) 
 
 
 
Danish 
Peoples Party 
– DF (13.2) 
 
Progress Party 
– FrP (22.1) 
Source: Current and past party programmes. 
* RV and V hardly count as ‘centre’ except in genesis, the former being close to the SD and the latter 
generally perceived as to the right of KF on the socio-economic left-right dimension. 
 
 
 
 
